

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

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P R 301748Z JAN 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0813

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0020

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT ONLY TO NATO DEPT, TURKISH  
FOREIGN MINISTRY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: UK AND GDR PRESENTATIONS AT  
JAN 30 PLENARY SESSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF  
THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, ON JAN 30,  
STATEMENTS WERE PRESENTED BY THE UK REP (ROSE) AND BY  
THE GDR REP (OESER).

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2. THE UK STATEMENT, APPROVED AT THE JAN 29 AD

HOC GROUP MEETING, WAS A SUMMARY PRESENTATION OF THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION AND ARGUMENTATION, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH EXISTING DISPARITIES. ROSE STRESSED THE GOAL OF NEGOTIATING MILITARY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS AND STATED THAT THE IMPORTANT PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS "CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF GREATER SECURITY WITHOUT THE REALITY." THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIED AIR NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL WAS underscored. THE UK STATEMENT WAS TRANSMITTED BY AIRGRAM.

3. THE GDR STATEMENT CONTAINED A REVIEW ALONG FAIRLY STANDARD LINES OF THE CURRENT EASTERN POSITION AND ARGUMENTATION. OESER REITERATED THE EASTERN WISH TO REACH AGREEMENT FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF "PRACTICAL MEASURES" IN 1975. HE INSISTED THAT ANY AGREEMENT CORRESPOND FULLY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, EQUALITY AND MUTUALITY, AS AGREED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THE GDR REP ASSERTED THAT THE NOV 8, 1973 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT, THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL AND THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL ALL FULLY CORRESPONDED TO THESE PRINCIPLES. HE CHARGED THAT WESTERN PROPOSALS TO DATE CONTRADICTED THE AGREED PRINCIPLES, WERE DESIGNED TO GAIN UNILATERAL WESTERN MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND THEREFORE WERE UNREALISTIC. REPLYING DIRECTLY TO US REP'S DEC 12 PLENARY STATEMENT, OESER DENIED THAT THE EAST WISHED TO AVOID SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. GDR REP STRESSED REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS OF PERSONNEL. COMMENT - FOLLOWING OESER'S STATEMENT, BOTH GDR DEP REP (WIELAND) AND SOVIET DELOFF (ABARENKOV) SEPARATELY APPROACHED US DELOFF AND EXPLICITLY CRITICIZED THE ALLIED AIR NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL FOR FAILURE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ARMAMENTS. END SUMMARY.

4. THE TEXT OF THE GDR STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

1. AS WE RESUME OUR WORK, I WOULD LIKE FIRST OF ALL TO EXPRESS OUR BEST WISHES TO ALL THE DELEGATES FOR THE NEW YEAR.  
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WE NOW WRITE 1975. WE THUS HAVE ENTERED A YEAR WHICH, IN LINE WITH THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, SHOULD BE THE FIRST YEAR IN WHICH PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE CAN BE REALIZED. THIS IS ALSO THE YEAR OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION FROM FASCISM, WHICH THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE GDR -- TOGETHER WITH THE USSR WHICH BORE THE BRUNT OF THE STRUGGLE--

REGARD AS A HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DO EVERYTHING  
POSSIBLE TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER STATES IN THE SOCIALIST  
COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AND WITH ALL PEACE LOVING PEOPLES TO  
MAKE THE PEACE WHICH WAS WON BY THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION  
WITH SUCH GREAT SACRIFICES DURABLE AND STABLE IN THE FUTURE  
AS WELL.

2. THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE PUT GREAT HOPE IN OUR  
NEGOTIATIONS. THEY EXPECT THAT WE WILL ACHIEVE PROGRESS  
IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL SUPPLEMENT AND MAKE MORE  
MEANINGFUL A POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MEASURES  
HAVING A MILITARY CHARACTER. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE  
SOCIALIST STATES HAVE MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS IN PREVIOUS  
ROUNDS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT  
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THEY HAVE SUBMITTED A  
COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT PROPOSAL, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES  
AGREED TO BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, CONCERNING THE PRACTICAL  
SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND  
ARMAMENTS, AS WELL AS SUPPLEMENTAL COMPROMISE PROPOSALS.  
ALL THESE CONSTITUTED A GOOD BASE, ENABLING US TO  
ARRIVE AT CONCRETE DETERMINATIONS ALREADY IN 1974, AND  
TO INITIATE 1975 WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF PRACTICAL  
MEASURES.

3. LET ME RECALL FOR YOU THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES MADE BY  
THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, BECAUSE, UNFORTUNATELY, THE  
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE NEITHER MATCHED  
THESE INITIATIVES WITH SOMETHING OF THE SAME QUALITY, NOR  
HAVE WE SEEN ANY CONSTRUCTIVE REACTION TO THEM.

4. ON THE CONTRARY, IN CONTRADICTION TO THE AGREED BASIC  
PRINCIPLES OF THE PREAPATORY TALKS, THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM  
BY OUR WESTERN PARTNERS CONTINUED TO BE GOVERNED BY A SEARCH  
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FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS RESULT UNILATERAL  
MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN THEIR FAVOR AND TO THE DETRIMENT  
OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. IT WAS ALSO  
TROUBLESOME FOR THEM TO SHOW MOVEMENT AND A READINESS FOR  
COMPROMISE, AND TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN A SEARCH FOR  
REALISTIC SOLUTION WHICH COULD HAVE MOVED THE  
NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

5. EVEN THOUGH THE GDR DELEGATION IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT  
BY NOW MORE COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS,  
IN DRAWING UP THIS SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE WAY THE TALKS HAVE  
BEEN PROCEEDING UP TO NOW  
IT IS MOTIVATED BY A STRIVING TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEW YEAR.  
THE GDR HAS A VESTED INTEREST IN THIS. IN THIS CONNECTION  
I WOULD LIKE TO REFER TO WHAT ERICH HONECKER, FIRST SECRETARY

OF THE SED CENTRAL COMMITTEE, STATED ON THE DAY  
THE LAST PLENARY OF THE PREVIOUS ROUND

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0814

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0020

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

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FOREIGN MINISTRY

TOOK PLACE: "IN THE INTEREST OF SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL  
WITH MILITARY DETENTE AS WELL AS DISARMAMENT AND ARMS  
LIMITATIONS, WE ASSIGN GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE VIENNA  
NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS THE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO  
REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL REDUCE THE HIGH CONCENTRATION  
OF THE MOST POWERFUL FORCE COMPONENTS OF BOTH SOCIAL SYSTEMS

WITHOUT CHANGING THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY  
FORCES IN FAVOR OF ONE SIDE. THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE  
PREPARED TO MAKE THE KIND OF REDUCTIONS WHICH WILL NOT  
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RESULT IN MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR ANY OF THE PARTICIPATING  
STATES TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

... FURTHERMORE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS  
PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS, THE GDR WILL SPEAK UP UNPER-  
TURBED IN FAVOR OF PRACTICAL AND JUST REDUCTION RESULTS.

IN THIS CONNECTION IT WILL BE STRICTLY GUIDED BY THE  
PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPATING  
STATES. RESULTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WILL BECOME  
POSSIBLE ONCE THE NATO STATES ALSO ACT ACCORDING TO THIS  
PRINCIPLE."

6. PERMIT ME TO PRESENT A FEW CONSIDERATIONS WHICH IN  
OUR VIEW SHOW THE DIRECTION IN WHICH OUR WORK IN THE  
PERIOD LYING AHEAD OF US SHOULD MOVE. EVERY STEP WE TAKE  
HERE MUST SERVE ONE AIM. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PRACTICAL  
AND JUST RESULTS WHICH LEAD TO A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF  
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF SUCH A  
MAGNITUDE THAT IT WILL RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF  
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THAT AREA NOT  
NECESSARY IN TIMES OF PEACE.

7. WE ALSO HAVE AVAILABLE TO US A GUIDE FOR PREPARING THE  
WAY IN WHICH SUCH A RESULT CAN BE ACHIEVED. THIS GUIDE  
CONTINUES TO BE THE PRINCIPLES ABOUT MUTUAL REDUCTION OF  
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TO WHICH ALL  
PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS HAVE AGREED.  
ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ACTUALLY SELFEVIDENT, IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS  
WE STILL HAVE NOT REACHED A UNANIMOUS CONCEPT CONCERNING  
THE PRINCIPAL MAIN PROBLEMS, THE SETTLEMENT OF WHICH WOULD  
CREATE THE PRECONDITIONS FOR PROCEEDING TO AN EXCHANGE OF  
VIEWS ABOUT RELATED QUESTIONS.

8. WE ARE STILL OCCUPIED WITH QUESTIONS SUCH AS THAT NOT  
ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WANT TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND  
ARMAMENTS ON A MUTUAL BASIS; THAT THERE IS NO READINESS  
TO REDUCE ALL FORCE ELEMENTS AND ARMAMENTS, AND IN THAT  
CONNECTION TO SET A CONCRETE DATE. THE  
SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS HAVE POINTED OUT REPEATEDLY THAT  
THE AGREE-TO BASIC PRINCIPLES CONTAIN CONCRETE DETERMINATIONS  
CONCERNING THESE MAIN QUESTIONS:

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-THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS. THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE CAN COMPLY WITH THIS DEMAND WHEN EACH OF THEM DECLARES ITS READINESS TO ACCEPT PRECISE OBLIGATIONS FOR EQUAL REDUCTIONS IN A MANNER WHICH WILL ASSURE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF EACH PARTICIPANT IN EVERY RESPECT AND AT EVERY POINT IN TIME.

-THERE HAS BEEN AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE A REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES. BASING OURSELVES ON THIS, WE HAVE GIVEN SCIENTIFIC PROOF THAT THIS REQUIRES THE INCLUSION OF GROUND FORCES, AND NUCLEAR UNITS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE REDUCTION.

-THERE HAS ALSO BEEN AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTIONS. HENCE, IF WE WANT TO DO JUSTICE TO THIS REQUIREMENT, WE CANNOT PERMIT A LIMITATION TO GROUND FORCES ONLY, BUT MUST AT THE SAME TIME ASK FOR THE INCLUSION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

9. THERE ARE WITHOUT A DOUBT THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE CONCERNED HERE NOT WITH CHANGING THEM, BUT TO GIVE BODY TO THEM WITH CONCRETE COMMITMENTS.

10. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE FOUR DIRECT SOCIALIST PARTICIPANTS HAVE MADE THAT THE BASIS FOR THEIR PROPOSALS.

11. THAT APPLIES TO OUR REDUCTION PROPOSAL AS A WHOLE, AND TO ALL ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS. THE MEASURES DEVELOPED IN IT MAKE A PRACTICAL AND JUST REALIZATION OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS TO WHICH WE ASPIRE POSSIBLE. THEY PROVIDE FOR EQUIVALENCE AND COMPREHENSIVE MUTUALITY CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ACCEPTED. THEY MAKE CERTAIN THAT FOR THE DURATION OF THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS, NONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS CAN OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS. BY THEIR COMPLEX APPROACH THEY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER. THE MEASURES OFFER US A PRACTICAL WAY OF SHOWING US HOW TO ACHIEVE CONSIDERABLE REDUCTIONS IN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME THROUGH NUMERICAL OR EQUAL-PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF INTEGRATED WHOLE MILITARY UNITS.

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12. AS YOU ALL KNOW, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS UP TO NOW WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE AN APPROXIMATION OF THE TWO POINTS OF VIEW CONCERNING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN

CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SITUATION THUS CREATED HAS MOTIVATED THE SOCIALIST STATES TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST INITIAL PROGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES. THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT CONCERNING AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN 1975 AS PROPOSED BY THEM IS TRULY AN OFFER BY THE SOCIALIST STATES TO ITS WESTERN PARTNERS IMBUED WITH SINCERE READINESS FOR COMPROMISE, FOR IT TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION A SERIES OF ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR POSITION.

13. THE WESTERN STATES HAVE UNFORTUNATELY OPTED FOR A NEGATIVE REACTION TO OUR OFFER, SO THAT WE STILL HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH RESPECT TO ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FIRST SOLUTIONS.

14. THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TOWARD THE END OF THE PREVIOUS ROUND BY THE DIRECT SOCIALIST PARTICIPANTS CONCERNING A MUTUAL COMMITMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS THEREFORE INTENDED AT LEAST NOT TO IMPEDE THE FLOW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH AVOIDABLE COMPLICATIONS.

15. IN VIEW OF THESE INTENSIVE EFFORTS BY THE SOCIALIST STATES TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FIRST RESULTS WE WERE SURPRISED BY THE REACTION OF THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S., AS CONTAINED IN HIS

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIRRITY 0815  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0020

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

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TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

PRESENTATIVE OF DECEMBER 12, 1974. IN IT HE ASSERTS THAT  
A "BASIC NEW QUESTION" HAS ARisen, AND IN EFFECT ACCUSES  
THE SOCIALIST STATES THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN  
ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIVE REDUCTIONS IN ARMED  
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

16. BUT IF WE SUBMIT THE SITUATION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO  
A REALISTIC ANALYSIS, IT BECOMES MOST EVIDENT THAT THE  
FACTS SHOW EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE. THE ENTIRE APPROACH BY  
THE SOCIALIST STATES IS RESOLUTELY AIMED AT REACHING AN  
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AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES  
AND ARMAMENTS WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE REMOVAL OF THE  
MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

17. FIRST OF ALL, I CAN ONLY STRESS ONCE MORE WHAT HAS  
BEEN SAID HERE ON DECEMBER 12, 1974, BY THE HEAD OF THE  
SOVIET DELEGATION, COMRADE KHLESTOV, NAMELY THAT THE SOCIALIST  
STATES ARE READY NOW TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ABOUT THE  
MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS INVOLVING THE  
ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, TO THE TUNE OF 15-17 PER CENT.  
THE DRAFT PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, CONTAINS AN ENTIRE  
PROGRAM FOR REDUCTIONS WITHIN A FIXED TIME FRAME.

18. SECOND, IT IS A FACT THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS  
ARE AS YET NOT READY FOR SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ON  
THE BASIS OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES.

19. THIRD, THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE DEVELOPING INITIATIVES  
WHICH MAKE PRACTICAL RESULTS IN A SHORT PERIOD OF  
TIME POSSIBLE, AND WHICH AT THE SAME TIME REPRESENT EFFECTIVE

STEPS ON THE ROAD TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.

20. IN THE FOURTH PLACE, IN THIS CONNECTION THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO JUSTIFIED THEIR PHASED APPROACH BY STATING THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE ON "TOO MUCH OF A SUBSTANTIVE" CHARACTER FOR THEM OR IN OTHER WORDS, IT WOULD TAKE ON OVERLARGE DIMENSIONS. WE DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW, BECAUSE EVERY PARTICIPANT ACCEPTS PRECISE AND WELL-DEFINED OBLIGATIONS FROM THE VERY START, AS PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973. BUT IN A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE WE WERE PREPARED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THIS VIEW HELD BY THE WESTERN STATES, AND W HAVE DONE THIS IN THE FORM OF PROPOSING AN INITIAL STEP.

21. FIFTH, THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING AN INITIAL STEP IS IN NO WAY INSIGNIFICANT. BY INCLUDING ARMAMENTS, IT GOES BEYOND THE REDUCTION PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS FOR THEIR FIRST PHASE.

22. SIXTH, IN THE LAST INSTANCE, A MEASURE LIKE THE  
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PROPOSED "JOINT DECLARATION" CAN TAKE ON GREAT MEANING FOR ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, BECAUSE IT WOULD PUT HURDLES IN THE WAY OF A POSSIBLE WORSENING OF THE CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING FROM A STEADY CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE.

23. IF THEREFORE THE SITUATION IS VIEWED SOBERLY, IT WILL BECOME EVIDENT THAT ALTHOUGH THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES FREQUENTLY TALK ABOUT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, THEY HAVE SO FAR NOT SHOWN A READINESS TO MATCH THIS WITH DEEDES ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE.

24. ALL IN ALL, THE THREE PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BY THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE A SOLID FUNDATION, MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE STRAIGHT AND QUICKLY TOWARD THE AIMS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE AN EQUAL OBLIGATION TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THEM.

25. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE CONDUCT TO THE NEGOTIATIONS UP TO NOW HAS NOT CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE ALSO PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEIR OBLIGATIONS. WHAT THEY HAVE SUBMITTED AS CONCRETE PROPOSALS SO FAR, AS WELL AS THEIR REACTION TO THE PROPOSALS BY THE SOCIALIST STATES, SHOWS THAT THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO THEIR UNREALISTIC POSITIONS OF NOVEMBER 22, 1973.

26. UP TO NOW, THE WESTERN APPROACH PROVIDES SOLELY FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, AND THUS GOES MOST OBVIOUSLY COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THE SOCIALIST STATES CANNOT AGREE TO THAT.

27. THE SESSION JUST PASSED HAS, HOWEVER, CLEARLY SHOWN AGAIN THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST ACCEPT EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS PRECISELY EQUAL OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE.

28. THE PAST ROUND HAS ALSO SHOWN THAT AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR-ARMED UNITS MUST BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. IN  
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THAT CASE, WE CANNOT JUST TALK ABOUT PERSONNEL STRENGTH; WHAT IS NEEDED IS THE READINESS TO REDUCE PERSONNEL AND ARMAMENTS.

29. THESE WERE SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS A LOOK AT WHERE WE HAVE TO CONCENTRATE IN OUR FUTURE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS. WE HOPE THAT OUR WESTERN PARTNERS WERE ABLE TO UTILIZE THE RECESS JUST CONCLUDED FOR TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES. WE WOULD WELCOME IT IF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD COME UP WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM, SO THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS CAN MOVE FORWARD IN THE INTEREST OF DETENTE, STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, AND THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.

30. I WOULD LIKE ONCE MORE TO UNDERLINE THE READINESS OF THE GDR DELEGATION TO TAKE PART IN ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS.

31. PERMIT ME TO EXPRESS THE HOPES THAT THE YEAR 1975 WILL ENABLE US TO ACHIEVE FIRST RESULTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT.

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